The New York Times News Articles
The Military Is Not a Social
Program
August 1993
Also available on the New York Times Website
ARLINGTON, Va. —In looking for someone to head the United
States complex and dangerous military operations in the Pacific
(including the Korean Peninsula) one could hardly have found an
officer more qualified than Adm. Stanley R. Arthur - who until
recently was indeed the nominee for the job. And in seeking an
example of how far Pentagon leadership has fallen, and how the issue
of sexual harassment has descended into ugly McCarthyism, one could
hardly find a more telling case than Admiral Arthur's sudden
dispatch to early retirement.
Admiral Arthur is a hero of two wars - a pilot who earned
an extraordinary 11 Distinguished Flying Crosses while flying more
than 500 combat missions in Vietnam, then commanding the allied
naval armada in the Persian Gulf. His Pentagon experience since is
exemplary, too, including high level budget planning, nearly three
years as chief of the Navy's worldwide logistics system and two
years as Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
After Admiral Arthur was nominated for the Pacific command,
Senator David Durenberger of Minnesota indicated that he would term
questions about the treatment of a constituent, a female officer who
claimed the Navy treated her unfairly when she failed flight
training after accusing an instructor of sexual harassment. Admiral
Arthur's only role in the case was that of final reviewing officer.
He approved earlier findings that although the woman, Lieut. (j.g.)
Rebecca Hansen, had been harassed (the Navy had already disciplined
an instructor), she failed to quality as a pilot because of a poor
flight record, both before and after the incident.
The inspectors general of the Navy and the Defense
Department agreed with this finding. Navy Secretary John H. Dalton
approved a recommendation that the Navy prepare to discharge her.
Key senators told the Pentagon that Admiral Arthur would be approved
for his new command but that because of Mr. Durenberger's "hold" his
confirmation might be delayed until fall.
Then on June 24, the Navy said in a terse statement that
Admiral Arthur "agrees with Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike
Boorda" that his nomination should be withdrawn because an
"anticipated delay in Senate confirmation" would not permit "a
prompt relief" for Adm. Charles R. Larson, the current commander in
the Pacific, who is scheduled to become Superintendent of the Naval
Academy. Admiral Arthur is to be retired as soon as his job is
filled.
The Navy's explanation was disingenuous at best. Admiral
Larson's new assignment is not time-sensitive; in fact, it also
awaits Senate action. It has been widely reported that Admiral
Boorda is less concerned about a delay in Admiral Arthur's
confirmation than about becoming ensnared in another sexual
harassment scandal. Even Senator Durenberger's key staff assistant
said he was "flabbergasted" by the decision to end Admiral Arthur's
37year career in such a manner.
More important, this episode raises serious questions about
Admiral Boorda's fitness to be Chief of Naval Operations and
demonstrates the Clinton Administration's lack of regard for
military leaders.
Admiral Boorda has gained a reputation for political
expediency. In 1992, when he was Chief of Personnel, he summarily
relieved one of the Navy's brightest young admirals, Jack Snyder,
after the initial revelations about the Tailhook scandal. Admiral
Snyder, who had gone well beyond what was required in his efforts to
assist the key female witness and urge an investigation, was not
even allowed to defend his actions. This abandonment of a deserving
officer in the face of political attack did not hurt Admiral
Boorda's chances for advancement - which may well have encouraged
his shoddy treatment of Admiral Arthur.
After quashing Admiral Arthur's career, Admiral Boorda
disregarded Secretary Dalton's recommendation to discharge
Lieutenant Hansen and went to Great Lakes, Ill., to meet with her.
She presented him with 10 demands, including that the Navy rewrite
her fitness reports using words of her choosing, that they send her
to law school at the Navy's expense and then assign her to work as a
lawyer handling women's issues, and that the Secretary officially
apologize to her. According to The New York Times, Admiral Boorda
responded by offering her a job on his personal staff. (She did not
accept it.)
Under any standard of leadership, Admiral Boorda's conduct
is seriously deficient on several grounds: disloyalty to deserving
subordinates, faulty judgment and usurping the authority of the
Secretary of the Navy.
Which leads us to the Clinton Administration's handling of
this event. Once his nomination went forward, Admiral Arthur was the
President's candidate, and it was not within Admiral Boorda's
jurisdiction to withdraw. In fact, since the Pacific command is
"purple" - that is, commanding military units from all the services
- Admiral Arthur was technically never Admiral Boorda's candidate
from the beginning. And yet after the withdrawal we heard no word
from either the Secretary of the Navy or the President, and Defense
Secretary William J. Perry merely said he had decided not to
intervene.
On July 1 the Administration announced that Vice Adm.
Richard Macke, a capable but far less experienced officer who had
been slated to replace Admiral Arthur as Vice Chief of Naval
operations, would be nominated instead to the Pacific command. Thus
a three-star officer is to be placed in the Navy's most senior and
prestigious four-star bilk partly because his paperwork was already
in the White House.
The casual way in which the Administration has dealt with
command replacement for a theater where war could be imminent
indicates either naiveté or arrogance when it comes to the
importance of strong military leadership. And it is a grim omen for
the future of the U.S. military when competent warriors are sent
home by political admirals.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS