The New York Times News Articles
What To Do About China
June 15, 1998
Also available on the New York Times Website
ARLINGTON, Va. —For more than a decade many concerned observers have
warned of the dangers in reaching a one-sided rapprochement with
China. Invariably, such trepidations have been minimized by
"pragmatic" political voices, or shouted down by business leaders
who were seduced by China's vast potential market only to become
hostages should our policies toward that country turn more
confrontational.
The past several years have seen an acceleration of this willing
self-deception. The Clinton Administration, buttressed by
endorsements from former Republican officials, speaks wanly of a
strategic partnership with China. Our crucial alliance with Japan
has been strained. Our position in the rest of Asia is being
undermined as we shift longstanding trade patterns away from
countries with strong preferences for the free market and democracy
in favor of China.
Meanwhile the Chinese Government's repression and blatant economic
corruption have been explained away as Internal matters,
particularly by American business. Its courting of Muslim nations
like Iran, Pakistan and Libya and attempts to penetrate the American
political process through campaign donations have been dismissed as
presenting no long-term threat.
In the past few weeks the folly of this benign approach
became evident with the emergence of both India and Pakistan as
nuclear powers. Our failure to censure China for its unremitting
efforts to help Pakistan become a nuclear power has dramatically
altered the strategic world order, and the role the United States
must play in it. The implications of world inaction in the face of
China's audacity are of the utmost gravity, far beyond such matters
as gang warfare in Somalia, petty dictators in Haiti and even the
irredentist bloodletting in the Balkans that have thus far sufficed
as foreign policy threats to this Administration.
The actions of the Chinese Government in this turn of events loom
much larger than Pakistan's or India's. It would have been
impossible for Pakistan to develop a nuclear capability without the
illicit aid of the Chinese. And while one can justly condemn India
for having fired the first shot, the reality of China and Pakistan
combining forces in such a manner makes its actions understandable
if not commendable.
American Government and business leaders are thus left with the
unavoidable truth that China, despite its constant protests to the
contrary, can no longer claim to be a non-expansionist power. And
they must now prepare for the future consequences of that reality.
They can begin by putting American relationships with Japan, India,
Israel and Russia on a much firmer footing. Along with the United
States, these four countries possess the key ingredients of
geography, military and economic power, and technological
superiority to insure that China's future conduct conforms to
international norms.
First, Japan. Despite continual bickering over
trade policy and its recent economic problems, Japan remains our sin
le most important bilateral relationship. At the same time, Japan to
date accounts for nearly 10 percent of direct investment in the
Chinese economy, and 30 percent of China's external borrowing.
Through its power to reorient these activities, Japan has the
standing to influence China's economic and military conduct,
particularly with American backing. As relations with China enter a
new phase, we should work to strengthen this most important of
alliances.
Second, Israel. It stands to lose greatly through
the strategic axis China is developing with the Muslim world. The
first foreign official to visit Pakistan after its detonation of
nuclear devices was Iran's Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, who
proclaimed that "Muslims now feel more confident that Pakistan's
nuclear capability would play a role of deterrence to Israel's."
Though he later played down this statement, the world must consider
it in the context of Iran's attempt to develop nuclear weapons of
its own also with Chinese - and Russian,-assistance. The United
States and Israel must keep the rest of the world focused on this,
and should not rule out pre-emptive military strikes if there is
evidence that Iran is building a weapon.
Third, Russia. Its, assistance to Iran and
even to China seems based on its own economic need in the absence of
a national strategy, as opposed to China's conscious designs. With
respect to these two nations, American foreign policy has reached a
true historic paradox. Having brought the Soviet Union to its knees,
we watched Russia struggle with democracy at the same time we were
flooding nondemocratic China with an excess balance of trade. As a
result China now is rich enough to short-cut its rise as a
superpower by buying Russian hardware and technical assistance off
the shelf.
A principal goal of American foreign policy should be to offer
Russia incentives to cease providing China and other nations with
such capabilities. Russia itself should need little coaxing. The
Soviet Union developed a strategic alliance with India in the early
1970's partly as a counterpoint to then-evolving Chinese power.
Russia has a history of immigration and boundary disputes emanating
from 2,600 miles of shared border with China, and remains at risk in
its sparsely populated and mineral-rich eastern territories.
Fourth, India. Its importance to our strategic
interests deserves fresh scrutiny. Although American businesses have
become India's main trading partners, it has long been ignored by
United States policy makers. India, a democracy with a legal system
based on English common law, has the demographic makeup and
geographical position to become an important ally, as well as a
trading partner on a much larger scale. Its population of nearly one
billion represents a potential consumer base almost as large as
China's.
Our past tensions with India can be understood in part by choices
made during the cold war, when both India and Indonesia sought
warmer relations with the former Soviet Union based on their mutual
fear of China's move toward regional dominance. Although India
signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971, it did so
when the Nixon Administration was vigorously pursuing fresh
relations with China. Nor should stronger relationships with India
be interpreted by Pakistan as a rejection of our interests in that
country, any more than Pakistan's closeness to China has been viewed
here as a rejection of the United States.
In addition to invigorating these relationships and holding on to
its traditional base of European allies the United States also must
clean its own house in terms of technology transfers and
acquiescence in the face of irresponsible Chinese conduct.
Beyond doubt, China will object to such a refocusing of policy with
accusations of an attempt to "contain" legitimate Chinese interests.
But every expansionist power in this century has made similar claims
against those who have tried to quell their aggression. And it is
China, through its internal repression, encouragement of nuclear
proliferation, and even the possible manipulation of our political
process that has made such efforts necessary.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS