New York Times Articles
What To Do About China
June 15, 1998
ARLINGTON, VA, For more than a decade many concerned observers have warned
of the dangers in reaching a one-sided rapprochement with China. Invariably,
such trepidations have been minimized by "pragmatic" political voices, or
shouted down by business leaders who were seduced by China's vast potential
market only to become hostages should our policies toward that country turn
more confrontational.
The past several years have seen an acceleration of this willing
self-deception. The Clinton Administration, buttressed by endorsements from
former Republican officials, speaks wanly of a strategic partnership with
China. Our crucial alliance with Japan has been strained. Our position in the
rest of Asia is being undermined as we shift longstanding trade patterns away
from countries with strong preferences for the free market and democracy in
favor of China.
Meanwhile the Chinese Government's repression and blatant economic corruption
have been explained away as Internal matters, particularly by American
business. Its courting of Muslim nations like Iran, Pakistan and Libya and
attempts to penetrate the American political process through campaign
donations have been dismissed as presenting no long-term threat.
In the past few weeks the folly of this benign approach became evident with
the emergence of both India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. Our failure to
censure China for its unremitting efforts to help Pakistan become a nuclear
power has dramatically altered the strategic world order, and the role the
United States must play in it. The implications of world inaction in the face
of China's audacity are of the utmost gravity, far beyond such matters as gang
warfare in Somalia, petty dictators in Haiti and even the irredentist
bloodletting in the Balkans that have thus far sufficed as foreign policy
threats to this Administration.
The actions of the Chinese Government in this turn of events loom much larger
than Pakistan's or India's. It would have been impossible for Pakistan to
develop a nuclear capability without the illicit aid of the Chinese. And while
one can justly condemn India for having fired the first shot, the reality of
China and Pakistan combining forces in such a manner makes its actions
understandable if not commendable.
American Government and business leaders are thus left with the unavoidable
truth that China, despite its constant protests to the contrary, can no longer
claim to be a non-expansionist power. And they must now prepare for the future
consequences of that reality.
They can begin by putting American relationships with Japan, India, Israel and
Russia on a much firmer footing. Along with the United States, these four
countries possess the key ingredients of geography, military and economic
power, and technological superiority to insure that China's future conduct
conforms to international norms.
First, Japan. Despite continual bickering over trade policy and its
recent economic problems, Japan remains our sin le most important bilateral
relationship. At the same time, Japan to date accounts for nearly 10 percent
of direct investment in the Chinese economy, and 30 percent of China's
external borrowing. Through its power to reorient these activities, Japan has
the standing to influence China's economic and military conduct, particularly
with American backing. As relations with China enter a new phase, we should
work to strengthen this most important of alliances.
Second, Israel. It stands to lose greatly through the strategic axis
China is developing with the Muslim world. The first foreign official to visit
Pakistan after its detonation of nuclear devices was Iran's Foreign Minister,
Kamal Kharrazi, who proclaimed that "Muslims now feel more confident that
Pakistan's nuclear capability would play a role of deterrence to Israel's."
Though he later played down this statement, the world must consider it in the
context of Iran's attempt to develop nuclear weapons of its own also with
Chinese - and Russian,-assistance. The United States and Israel must keep the
rest of the world focused on this, and should not rule out pre-emptive
military strikes if there is evidence that Iran is building a weapon.
Third, Russia. Its, assistance to Iran and even to China seems
based on its own economic need in the absence of a national strategy, as
opposed to China's conscious designs. With respect to these two nations,
American foreign policy has reached a true historic paradox. Having brought
the Soviet Union to its knees, we watched Russia struggle with democracy at
the same time we were flooding nondemocratic China with an excess balance of
trade. As a result China now is rich enough to short-cut its rise as a
superpower by buying Russian hardware and technical assistance off the shelf.
A principal goal of American foreign policy should be to offer Russia
incentives to cease providing China and other nations with such capabilities.
Russia itself should need little coaxing. The Soviet Union developed a
strategic alliance with India in the early 1970's partly as a counterpoint to
then-evolving Chinese power. Russia has a history of immigration and boundary
disputes emanating from 2,600 miles of shared border with China, and remains
at risk in its sparsely populated and mineral-rich eastern territories.
Fourth, India. Its importance to our strategic interests deserves fresh
scrutiny. Although American businesses have become India's main trading
partners, it has long been ignored by United States policy makers. India, a
democracy with a legal system based on English common law, has the demographic
makeup and geographical position to become an important ally, as well as a
trading partner on a much larger scale. Its population of nearly one billion
represents a potential consumer base almost as large as China's.
Our past tensions with India can be understood in part by choices made during
the cold war, when both India and Indonesia sought warmer relations with the
former Soviet Union based on their mutual fear of China's move toward regional
dominance. Although India signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union in
1971, it did so when the Nixon Administration was vigorously pursuing fresh
relations with China. Nor should stronger relationships with India be
interpreted by Pakistan as a rejection of our interests in that country, any
more than Pakistan's closeness to China has been viewed here as a rejection of
the United States.
In addition to invigorating these relationships and holding on to its
traditional base of European allies the United States also must clean its own
house in terms of technology transfers and acquiescence in the face of
irresponsible Chinese conduct.
Beyond doubt, China will object to such a refocusing of. policy with
accusations of an attempt to "contain" legitimate Chinese interests. But every
expansionist power in this century has made similar claims against those who
have tried to quell their aggression. And it is China, through its internal
repression, encouragement of nuclear proliferation, and even the possible
manipulation of our political process that has made such efforts necessary.
James Webb was an Assistant Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration.
