ARLINGTON, Va. — This campaign was begun, like so
many others throughout history, with lofty exhortations from battlefield
commanders to their troops, urging courage, patience, compassion for the
Iraqi people and even chivalry. Within a week it had degenerated into an
unexpected ugliness in virtually every populated area where American and
British forces have come under fire. Those who believed from intelligence
reports and Pentagon war planners that the Iraqi people, and particularly
those from the Shiite sections of the southeast, would rise up to greet
them as liberators were instead faced with persistent resistance.
Near
Basra, as The Financial Times reported, "soldiers were not being welcomed
as liberators but often confronted with hatred." In the increasingly messy
fights around Nasiriya, Marine units, which earlier were ambushed while
responding to what appeared to be a large-scale surrender, had by the end
of the week destroyed more than 200 homes.
Visions of cheering throngs welcoming them as
liberators have vanished in the wake of a bloody engagement whose full
casualties are still unknown. Snippets of news from Nasiriya give us a
picture of chaotic guerrilla warfare, replete with hit-and-run ambushes,
dead civilians, friendly fire casualties from firefights begun in the dead
of night and a puzzling number of marines who are still unaccounted for.
And long experience tells us that this sort of combat brings with it a
"downstream" payback of animosity and revenge.
Other reports corroborate the direction that the war, as well as its
aftermath, promises to take: Iraqi militiamen, in civilian clothes, firing
weapons and disappearing inside the anonymity of the local populace.
So-called civilians riding in buses to move toward contact. Enemy
combatants mixing among women and children. Children firing weapons.
Families threatened with death if a soldier does not fight. A wounded
American soldier commenting, "If they're dressed as civilians, you don't
know who is the enemy anymore."
These actions, while reprehensible, are nothing more than classic
guerrilla warfare, no different in fact or in moral degree from what our
troops faced in difficult areas of Vietnam. In the Fifth Marine Regiment
area of operations outside Da Nang, we routinely faced enemy soldiers
dressed in civilian clothes and even as women. Their normal routes of
ingress and egress were through villages, and we fought daily in populated
areas. On one occasion a smiling, waving girl — no more than 7 years old —
lured a squad from my platoon into a vicious North Vietnamese crossfire.
And if a Vietcong soldier surrendered, it was essential to remove his
family members from their village by nightfall, or they might be killed
for the sake of discipline.
The moral and tactical confusion that surrounds
this type of warfare is enormous. It is also one reason that the Marine
Corps took such heavy casualties in Vietnam, losing five times as many
killed as in World War I, three times as many as in Korea and more total
casualties than in World War II. Guerrilla resistance has already proved
deadly in the Iraq war, and far more effective than the set-piece battles
that thus far have taken place closer to Baghdad. A majority of American
casualties at this point have been the result of guerrilla actions against
Marine and Army forces in and around Nasiriya. As this form of warfare has
unfolded, the real surprise is why anyone should have been surprised at
all. But people have been, among them many who planned the war, many who
are fighting it and a large percentage of the general population.
Why?
Partly because of Iraq's poor performance in the 1991 gulf war, which
caused many to underestimate Iraqi willingness to fight, while overlooking
the distinction between retreating from conquered territory and defending
one's native soil. And partly because protection of civilians has become
such an important part of military training. But mostly, because the
notion of fierce resistance cut against the grain of how this war was
justified to the American people.
The
strategies of both Iraq and the United States are only partly, some would
say secondarily, military. The key strategic prize for American planners
has always been the acceptance by Iraq's people of an invasion intended to
change their government. If the Iraqis welcomed us, the logic goes, it
would be difficult for those on the Arab street, as well as Americans and
others who questioned the wisdom of the war, to condemn our presence.
Thus, throughout the buildup to war, the Iraqis
were characterized to America — and to our military — as so brutally
repressed by Saddam Hussein's regime that they would quickly rise up to
overthrow him when the Americans arrived. This was clearly the expectation
of many American fighting men as they crossed into Iraq. "Their
determination was really a surprise to us all," said Brig. Gen. John Kelly
of the Marines on Friday. "What we were really hoping for was just to go
through and everyone would wave flags and all that."
On
the other side, the Iraqi regime has used both its ancient history and
American support of Israel in appealing to the nationalism of its people
to resist an invasion by an outside power. It is as yet unclear which
argument is succeeding, although early indications are that the American
invasion has stirred up enormous animosity.
The
initial bombing campaign was political, aimed at Iraqi leaders. The
current effort appears to be increasingly strategic, designed to damage
the Iraqi military's better units. After that, the next step is likely to
be a series of conventional engagements matching American armored and
infantry forces against Iraq's Republican Guard. The United States hopes
to force Iraq into fixed-position warfare or even to draw them into a wild
attack, where American technological superiority and air power might
destroy Iraq's best fighting force.
But
Iraq's leaders have reviewed their mistakes in the first gulf war and have
also studied the American efforts in Somalia and Kosovo. They will most
likely try to draw American units into closer quarters, forcing them to
fight even armored battles in heavily populated areas nearer to Baghdad.
This kind of fighting would be designed to drive up American casualties
beyond the point of acceptability at home, and also to harden Iraqi
resolve against the invaders.
If
American forces are successful in these engagements, the war may be over
sooner rather than later. But if these battles stagnate, guerrilla warfare
could well become pandemic, not only in Baghdad but also across Iraq. And
even considering the strong likelihood of an allied victory, it is hard to
imagine an end point without an extremely difficult period of occupation.
In fact, what will be called an occupation may
well end up looking like the images we have seen in places like Nasiriya.
Do Iraqis hate Saddam Hussein's regime more deeply than they dislike the
Americans who are invading their country? That question will still be with
this administration, and the military forces inside Iraq, when the
occupation begins, whether the war lasts a few more days or several more
months.
Or
worse, the early stages of an occupation could see acts of retribution
against members of Saddam Hussein's regime, then quickly turn into yet
another round of guerrilla warfare against American forces. This point was
made chillingly clear a few days ago by the leader of Iraq's major Shiite
opposition group, who, according to Reuters, promised armed resistance if
the United States remains in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is overthrown.
Welcome to hell. Many of us lived it in another era. And don't expect it
to get any better for a while.
James Webb, Secretary of
the Navy in the Reagan administration, was a Marine platoon and company
commander in Vietnam. He is an author and filmmaker.
