The Wall Street Journal News Articles
The Struggle for Mastery in Asia
April 13, 2001
"Draw them in with the prospect of gain, take them by confusion.
Use anger to throw them into disarray."
-- Sun Tzu, "The Art of War"
Pundits will no doubt spend the next several days arguing over the
language of the American apology that brought the crew of the Navy
EP-3E surveillance aircraft home from Hainan. They will ask what
will happen to the aircraft left behind, and what further actions
might be taken as a consequence of Chinese arrogance during a crisis
mostly of China's own making. But the largest lesson to be learned
from the events of the past two weeks relates to the long term, and
is serious in its implications for the future of the U.S. as an
Asian power.
From this point forward, no one should doubt that our overinvestment
in the economy of a nondemocratic and ever more aggressive nation
has seriously compromised our ability to conduct foreign policy in
the world's most dynamic region. And the fact that we have become
vulnerable to a Chinese military modernized through the benefits of
our own technology should give all of us pause.
Cold War Consequence
Although the Clinton administration's persistent corruption and
softness toward China enabled that country's recent surge in both
military power and adventurism, the present situation is in many
ways a consequence of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. From
Richard Nixon's first visit to China until the collapse of the
Soviet empire, there were sound strategic reasons for the U.S. to
cultivate a stronger China, in order to help counter a massive
Soviet push into East Asia.
By the mid-1980s, the Soviets had 370,000 ground troops in East
Asia, plus 85 Backfire bombers and 2,400 combat aircraft. Their
Pacific fleet boasted more than 600 warships, including two aircraft
carriers, 41% of the heavy surface ships in their navy, and 40% of
their nuclear submarines. They had accomplished the historic Russian
dream of having a warm-water port in the Pacific, and on any given
day two dozen Soviet ships were in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, as were
fighter, bomber and long-range reconnaissance aircraft. They were
still on the move in Afghanistan, and had an active defense
relationship with India that included providing India's navy with
nuclear submarines.
There was also an acceptable, if untested, logic at that time that
the Chinese political system could be permanently liberalized
through the mechanism of free trade. Sensible Americans believed
that contact with the outside world, the creation of a vibrant
middle class, and an exposure to creature comforts and individual
freedoms, all would combine to force major changes in the way
China's unelected leaders treated their own people.
But history, as T.S. Eliot once wrote, has many cunning passages,
and our careful partnership underwent surprising mutations as the
always-delicate power relationships of East Asia began to alter.
When the Soviet empire dissolved and the U.S. Navy's force structure
was cut in half, giving the impression of a partial American
withdrawal from Asia, the Chinese military moved into the vacuum.
China engaged in a massive modernization program, fueled largely by
purchases of Russian weaponry and bolstered by the acquisition of
American technology. It shifted its aviation doctrine from defensive
to offensive operations, including the ability for long-range
strikes throughout Southeast Asia. It has continuously rattled its
sabers over the issue of Taiwan. It has laid physical claim to the
disputed Paracel and Spratly Island groups, thus potentially
straddling one of the most vital sea lanes in the world. In the last
year it has made repeated naval excursions into Japanese territorial
waters, a cause for long-term concern as China still claims Japan's
Shenkaku Islands, just to the east of Taiwan, and has never accepted
the legitimacy of Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japan.
During this period, America's massive business investments
continued, but failed to bring about the kind of change that was
once envisioned. Much has been written about continued abuses of
human rights and political freedoms, but even in economic terms
China does not offer the kind of stability that normally accompanies
large-scale investment. A January study of 35 countries by
PricewaterhouseCoopers placed China dead last among the world's
economies in terms of "opacity," a measure of unclear legal systems,
accounting standards, and corruption.
In a twist that would have made both Marx and Sun Tzu laugh with
delight, the clearest impact of more than two decades of trade seems
to be that those who have invested in China have become hostages of
its undemocratic system, to the point that some have become
practiced apologists for the arrogance of its leadership.
Expressions of concern over China's frequent misbehavior are
dismissed by U.S. businessmen lobbying their own government, on the
grounds that China is merely growing into a superpower and room must
be made for such conduct. Little mention is made of the unassailable
fact that many who argue these points have been the enablers of
China's frequently irresponsible ascent -- all, as Lenin would have
put it, for a profit.
Over the past 10 years the second-tier countries in the region have
watched these developments carefully, history warning them that they
must hedge their bets against eventual change. The consistent
failure of the U.S. to take firm action against Chinese misconduct
in such highly visible matters as its assistance of Pakistan's
development of nuclear capability is viewed as a sign of a
permeating weakness. The mistreatment of our major ally Japan causes
some to wonder if Chinese power has become so dominant that we will
abandon old friends.
Some countries, such as Vietnam, have sought to copy China's
methodology. Others prepare quietly to accommodate a power shift if
it occurs, and are ever more hesitant to align themselves with the
U.S. on regional issues such as the EP-3E incident.
If we are to retain our rightful place as a Pacific power, we must
reverse the momentum that has carried over from the Cold War, and
begin treating China with the caution that its recent policies
demand. Three areas in particular seem to call for attention.
First, we should send very clear signals to China that we will not
tolerate the interference with military operations conducted in
international waterways or airspace. Northeast Asia is a busy and
volatile place. It is the only point in the world where the military
interests of the U.S., China, Japan and Russia intersect, and it is
complicated further by the unpredictable militarism of North Korea
as well as China's incessant threats against Taiwan.
With respect to Taiwan, we must be clear that we are firmly
committed to its defense until a peaceful, mutually acceptable
solution can be obtained regarding its political status. This is no
more than we guaranteed when Germany was divided, and it is the same
guarantee we have made in the case of a divided Korea.
Second, we should reinvigorate our vitally important relationship
with Japan, and we should more vigorously pursue a relationship with
India. Our relations with Japan suffered greatly during the Clinton
administration, chiefly through neglect as China was assiduously
courted at Japan's expense. India, nearly as populous and much more
democratic, is a natural and historic counterpoint to Chinese
expansionism. It boasts a reasonably transparent economic system,
and has moved away from the bilateral relationship it had with the
Soviets during the Cold War toward a more centrist position in Asia.
Dangers for Business
Third, American businesses should see the danger in having exposed
themselves to the unpredictable nature of an unelected,
authoritarian government, and seek investments elsewhere in Asia.
One of the reasons frequently mentioned for the collapse of
economies in such nations as Thailand was that cheap Chinese labor
drew investments away just as the emerging "tigers" began to develop
a middle class, in a sense punishing these nations for their very
success. It would be good for the region, as well as for the
national security of the U.S., if American companies took a second
look at the countries where so much was accomplished before the
collapse of 1997.
What the Chinese government does not seem to understand is that the
U.S. has no need to deal with them unless it suits its own national
interest. And it does not suit our national interest to advance the
ambitions of a hostile, arrogant leadership that seems bent on
driving us out of Asia.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS