The Wall Street Journal Editorials
Milo Mindbender Would Be Impressed
July 18, 1988
Are we saying we'll stay in the Gulf for so long as Iran is
at war with Iraq?
If so, does that make us an ally of Iraq? If so, is this in our
national interest?
American commentators have a proclivity for bypassing the
jugular on defense issues and going straight for the capillary. So
it is unsurprising that media analysis of the shootdown of the
Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes has focused repeatedly on the
technical aspects of the Aegis radar system, rather than why the
Aegis was positioned 24 hours a day in the Straits of Hormuz, and on
whether the captain had sufficient justification to order a
shootdown, rather than on who put him in such an untenable situation
in the first place.
Yes, here we go again: Blunder in the Gulf. Does the Navy
have the right ships? The top leadership has stumbled repeatedly in
development of force structure and use of force as it pursues an
unfocused, open-ended commitment in the Gulf and yet is questioned
by the media only the vaguest terms, while the military that must
put such concepts into practice is left holding the bag when things
go wrong.
Blaming the Navy
A year ago, the Bridgeton hit a mine in international
waters off of Farsi Island while being escorted by U.S. Navy ships
under the controversial agreement to reflag Kuwaiti tankers. Instead
of blaming the Iranians for their unprecedented act of mining
international waterways, the tendency was to blame the Navy. And
instead of reacting to this aggression by destroying Iranian naval
assets, defense leaders responded by saturating the Gulf with
American military forces that were not supposed to engage their
aggressor, but instead were supposed to intimidate him by their mere
presence.
Rather than destroying Iran's ability to lay mines, the
decision was made to continually sweep for the mines they were
laying. Minesweepers made their way from American coastal enclaves,
some called up from the reserves, even though the Saudis possessed
modern minesweepers sold to them by the U.S. precisely for this
contingency. Barges provided by Kuwait became floating U.S. military
bases with the mission of intercepting minelayers if they were
caught in the act. One was caught in the act and after great debate
was sunk; its crew returned to Iran.
Other hostile acts were responded to by target practice on
oil platforms. At the end of April, after the USS Roberts was hit
and probably permanently removed from the fleet by an Iranian mine,
two more oil platforms were destroyed. In the "fog of war" that
followed, we destroyed half of the Iranian navy in a few hours. And
since that time we have decided to defend all ships that request
assistance against all acts of aggression by Iran.
What's going on here? There is general world-wide agreement
that the U.S. "belongs" in the Persian Gulf. But analysis too seldom
questions the goals of the U.S., and how military forces should be
shaped by those goals. Over the past year the role of our military
has changed from the protection of U.S. interests in international
waters, to a rather aggressive and general form of "neutrality," to
a clear tilt toward Iraq that included protection of allied vessels
under attack, and finally to a self-appointed mission of protecting
all shipping against Iranian attacks. It was under this
all-encompassing, protective rubric that the USS Vincennes was
stationed full-time inside the narrow Straits of Hormuz at the end
of June, and it was while protecting a Danish ship from Iranian
gunboats that the Vincennes engaged the Airbus that had taken off
from nearby Bandar Abbas.
At no point since the beginning of our increased Persian
Gulf presence have government leaders clearly announced what our
national goals are, how we will know when they have been
accomplished, and under what circumstances we will decide to reduce
our military force structure. Such analytical planning has not taken
place inside government, either. Our military forces have been put
to dangerous tasks under vague political direction, with no
indication as to what it will take to complete their mission.
Lacking clear political goals, our responses to Iranian
aggression have been confusing. We have failed to use the right kind
of force when it was needed. We have used force when we should not
have, and on behalf of nations that do not really deserve our
protection. And most important, we have not taken advantage of the
versatility that naval assets offer, and reduced our military force
structure in a way that emits clear diplomatic signals. A golden
opportunity in this regard was lost after the USS Roberts was hit. The need for a sense of timing is a lesson that the administration
should have learned in Beirut.
What exactly, is a "win" in these circumstances? A year
ago, the reaction inside the administration was that every
successful convoy escort was a "win," which led to some cynicism
among the sailors who were doing the escorting. Congratulations, you
won. Go back and get another one. Since the decision has been made
to engage Iran on behalf of everyone who requests assistance, are we
now saying that we will stay in the Gulf for so long as Iran
contests Iraq's supply line, which means for so long as it is at war
with Iraq? If so, does that make us an ally of Iraq? If so, is this
itself in our national interest?
Those with even rudimentary knowledge of this region know
that its international complexities and divided loyalties are so
overwhelming that even Milo Minderbinder, the famed character in
Catch22 who by the end of the book was being paid by both sides to
supply and conduct World War II battles, would be impressed.
Consider a few of the realities:
The Iraqis have never been our friends, and in fact have
been the major Soviet friend in the region for many years.
Kuwait was willing to make a deal with the Soviets before
we agreed to reflag a number of its vessels, and despite all our
help had no compunctions against making a deal with them for
military arms a few days ago.
The Saudis have had a large impact on our decision-making
process. In an unusual move, Prince Bandar was receiving weekly
briefings in the Joint Chiefs of Staff while I was in the Pentagon.
They have excellent mine-sweeper assets that we sold them, and yet
have declined to take over the sweeping mission, claiming that their
sailors are not up to the job. They've cheered us on as we undertook
"brown-water" missions such as mine-sweeping and barges bases in the
Gulf, which should have been their own responsibility. And then they
bought long-range missiles from China (which is a principal supplier
Of Iran), and now have announced a $30 billion weapons purchase from
Britain.
The Japanese, who receive more than half the oil that flows
out of the Straits of Hormuz, have declined to help us in the
Persian Gulf, other than to parcel out a few million for
navigational aids, and to offer vague bribes if we will escort their
ships. Some believe it is their lack of naval assets, which is
palpably wrong. Others believe their constitution precludes such
operations, which also is wrong. The Japanese, who have been
positioning themselves at the financial center of the East, West,
and Third World, know that taking a military stand inevitably
creates diplomatic resentments. In a manner reminiscent of their
dealings elsewhere in the world, they have retained their excellent
relations with Iran while we have spent dollars and national
reputation protecting their interests.
At the time of the Airbus incident, the Vincennes was
defending a Danish ship from attacks by Iranian gunboats. Remember
the Danes? They haven't helped us in the Gulf and are sticking to a
"no nukes" policy on visits by our Navy.
The other day, U.S. helicopters fired on Iranian gunboats
that were preparing to attack a Panamanian ship near Farsi Island.
Remember the Panamanians? We felt strongly enough about the
corruption of their government that we attempted to shut it down a
few months ago.
Protecting Our Own Interests
Obviously, many considerations have caused these
inconsistencies, and it would be wrong to condemn nations that act
in the best interests of their people. The problem is that the U.S.
must start acting in the same way. Our national interests dictate
that we should be protecting our own interests in international
waterways, and perhaps those of allies who are clearly
reciprocating. If we had been following this precept, we would not
have tethered the Vincennes in the Straits of Hormuz to defend
against the Silkworm threat on behalf of all comers, and we would
have thought twice about defending ships of countries that aren't
defending us either physically or rhetorically.
Iran is not our enemy, except to the extent that it attacks
our vessels or our people, and then it should be dealt with
severely. Iraq is not our friend, except to the extent that it
continues in the wake of the Stark incident to respect our vessels,
our people, and our desire to see an end to the war, which it began
nine years ago. And the naval forces that protect our interests in
the Persian Gulf should be maneuverable, structured for swift and
massive retaliation if required, and fluidly deployed depending on
the ever-changing circumstances that caused their temporarily
enlarged presence in the first place. And over the long term, the
littoral countries in the Gulf have both the finances and the
capability to deploy their own permanent "brown-water" assets in
that region.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS